Naturally, the phrasing is slightly different, but that’s the effect. The draft bylaw, not yet approved by a national convention, reads in part
In the event of a dispute within the membership of an affiliate as to the proper identity of its Chair, the Libertarian National Committee, upon a petition of at least ten or 10% of the sustaining members of the Party residing in the appropriate state shall investigate and make a decision as to the identity of the affiliate’s Chair by using the affiliate’s own governing documents and rules as well as these Bylaws.
Astute readers will note that there is no requirement that even one of the petitioners be a member of the state party. The petitioners requesting LNC intervention only need to be sustaining members who are resident of the state in question. Once one member of a state party disputes the identity of its Chair, and at least ten or 10% of the sustaining members in the state sign a petition, the LNC will be able to come in and decide who the state chair is.
Solution, if you don’t like this for your state: Eliminate the Chair position. Use a different organization.
1. Do you want to limit that power?
2. If yes, how do you want to limit it?
1) Yes
2) Explicitly state that internal disputes within an affiliate are not subject to LNC intervention.
Well, we have one area of agreement at least.
So what’s your solution if two groups of people both claim to be the legitimate affiliate? It seems like you’re saying that no decision can be made to who the LNC recognizes. If that’s the case, is the LNC forced to recognize every group who makes that claim?
“is the LNC forced to recognize every group who makes that claim?”
The LNC is under no obligation to have an affiliate in any state* (bylaws include DC & the territories in this definition), and is prohibited from recognizing more than one affiliate from any state.
“what’s your solution if two groups of people both claim to be the legitimate affiliate?”
This answer is a little trickier.
1) Article 5, Section 5 of the LP National bylaws states: “The autonomy of the affiliate and sub-affiliate parties shall not be abridged by the National Committee or any other committee of the Party, except as provided by these bylaws.”
2) The governance of an affiliate party is determined by its constitution and/or bylaws.
3) Any dispute should be resolved locally by following the processes in the affiliate’s constitution and/or bylaws. In most states this would be an appeal to the affiliate’s Judicial Committee.
4) If the LNC chooses to recognize a group other than the existing recognized affiliate, Article 5 Section 6 of the National bylaws outlines a procedure for revoking the status of any affiliate party, the motion to revoke must be for cause, and requires a 3/4 majority vote. This action can then be appealed to the national Judicial Committee.
The proposal you have put forward would not require a super-majority of the LNC to effectively revoke the affiliate status of a state party.
How do you reconcile your proposal with Article 5 Sections 5 & 6?
It actually works well with both of those other sections, and is meant specially to dovetail with them.
The proposals insistence that the finding of the affiliates judicial committee be accepted as the authority in these cases preserves the autonomy of the affiliate. So does the proposed bylaw being narrowly constructed to only be about who the LNC recognizes as the chair of the affiliate. Making those things specific is designed to protect an affiliate from an overinterested LNC.
The proposed bylaw is also meant to be entirely separate from the disaffiliation process, and that’s on purpose too. Disaffiliation was not designed for disputed leadership claims, and I don’t think it’s a good way to solve them. In my estimation, New Mexico was not handled well.
The whole purpose of the proposal is found in the three words “existing recognized affiliate”. It’s constructed to decipher, not decide, what that is.
“The proposals insistence that the finding of the affiliates judicial committee be accepted as the authority in these cases preserves the autonomy of the affiliate.”
I don’t see anything about “the affiliates judicial committee” in your proposal.
“In the event of a dispute within the membership of an affiliate as to the proper identity of its Chair, the Libertarian National Committee, upon a petition of at least ten or 10% of the sustaining members of the Party residing in the appropriate state shall investigate and make a decision as to the identity of the affiliate’s Chair by using the affiliate’s own governing documents and rules as well as these Bylaws.”
It’s the next sentence.
Darryl,
If one of your edits was made it would read either:
“In the event of a dispute within the membership of an affiliate as to the proper identity of its Chair, the Libertarian National Committee, upon a petition of the lesser of ten or 10% of the sustaining members of the Party residing in the appropriate state…”
or,
“In the event of a dispute within the membership of an affiliate as to the proper identity of its Chair, the Libertarian National Committee, upon a petition of at least ten or 10% of the sustaining members of the Party residing in the appropriate state, whichever is less…”
I don’t like the second wording, but the first is OK. I’ll float it to the committee and see what they think.
Note that the rest of the proposed bylaw change includes a check on the LNC from both the judicial committee of that affiliate and the national judicial committee. The goal is not to allow National to take over an affiliate they don’t like, but instead to force the LNC to recognize the leadership of an affiliate that is most legitimate according to that affiliate’s own bylaws.
The goals of the proposal are:
a) to prevent affiliate splintering by making it less likely for an illegitimate takeover to succeed, and
b) to make it less of a crap shoot about what’s going to happen when one of these disputes arise. If we go by written process instead of the vagaries of tradition it makes the outcome both more predictable and more fair.
It also makes it more likely for a faction that controls the LNC & JC to gain control of an affiliate after finding 10 members live in the jurisdiction of said affiliate.
I didn’t bring up the edit at this bylaws meeting because we were in the last half hour of it, but I can bring it up at the beginning of the next one in two weeks.
BTW, the bylaws meetings are open to the public and happen over zoom. We encourage participation, and there’s public comment at the beginning and end of each one.
There should also be a survey coming out sometime over the next couple of weeks in email asking LP members for feedback on the first six bylaws proposals, including this one.
Now for debate:
This bylaws proposal doesn’t give the LNC any power it doesn’t already have. An LNC and JC can, right now, choose to recognize one group instead of another as its affiliate in some state.
The reason I wrote this proposal, and the reason I’ve been very willing to amend it as people have given input is because I think the status quo is bad.
Right now there’s no formal way to deal with an affiliate dispute, but we’ve built up a tradition of how we deal with them. Each new LNC shoots from the hip when it happens, and each new JC has to decide whether it has jurisdiction in that case and what the LNCs powers are.
If you don’t like this proposal I’m cool with that, but I hope you also don’t like the way we currently handle it. Whatever the best way is to handle a Deleware, a Michigan, or a New Mexico, please find out and propose amendments, but in this case having an imperfect solution is better than having no solution.
>This bylaws proposal doesn’t give the LNC any power it doesn’t already have.
>Right now there’s no formal way to deal with an affiliate dispute.
Pick one
They’re both true. Right now the LNC recognizes one group, and not another, in every state where two groups of people both claim to be the legitimate affiliate. The power exists. The only questions are:
1. Do you want to limit that power?
2. If yes, how do you want to limit it?
Do not assume that an affiliate can only de disaffiliated for a leadership dispute. That is a power currently granted to the LNC, subject to appeal to the JC.
This does give a specific method for resolving disputes as to who is the legitimate chair of an affiliate. It would NOT require disaffiliation to settle that type of dispute. Further, as either side could appeal, it permits the JC to serve as a check on the LNC power in this matter.
Bingo.
There are a few reasons to not use outside arbitration.
1. Both sides would have to agree to it beforehand.
2. It would probably be expensive.
3. There’s no guarantee that the losing side would abide by the decision once it’s made.
By the way, I’m the guy who sponsored this bylaws proposal. Ask me anything.
By “upon a petition of at least ten or 10% of the sustaining members of the Party residing in the appropriate state” do you mean the greater of those numbers, or the smaller of the two?
In some states, 10 members might be 10% of the sustaining membership while in other states 10% of membership would be much larger.
The smaller of the two. You can either get 10 members (if it’s a big state) or 10% of the members (if it’s a small state).
Thank you for clarifying, the text should make this clear.
If you have more clear language I can propose it. There are still a couple bylaws meetings left.
The language could say “the lesser of 10 members…..” or you could add “whichever is less” after “the appropriate state.”
Though I would prefer it to be the larger of the two. Especially when one considers that 10 members is still less than 10% of the number of delegates that California sends to the national convention.
As one of the JC dissenters in the Delaware case, I do not think a bylaw change that codifies the Delaware decision is a good idea. Next month I will offer a minority report if I can find another bylaws committee member to join me. Anyone out there who has suggestions of alternative approaches can feel free to email me with possible language.
I am confident I can find others on the committee to join me in minority reports for the other few proposals I have issues with, but this particular proposal I may be the lone dissenter among the 10 committee members. We’ll see.
This basically codifies prior LNC decisions, especially in Delaware case.
Since this involves “the proper identity of its Chair,” the chair, or multiple claimants, will likely be members of the affiliate. 🙂
“This basically codifies prior LNC bylaws-violating attempts to usurp state affiliate autonomy, especially in Delaware case.”
Fixed, no charge.
The LNC can create, and identify the chair of any group within a state already. That group need not be in privity with its secretary of state, they can still affiliate. What the current LNC wants is the power to take that group’s ballot line when they just don’t like the members.
Why would you even think that.
1. The LNC cannot create a state chair, even in a state without an affiliate. The people in the state would have to petition.
2. As noted, a group that thought itself the proper group could petition the Judicial Committee.
The LNC would not be the final word.
This proposal does not, and cannot, affect who has the Libertarian ballot line in a state. It also doesn’t allow an LNC to just pick its favorite people; it has to respect the affiliates own bylaws and JC.
I have learned to be a little distrustful of LNCs lately, but I trust even less the whims of Secretaries of State.
“Is there a reason not to use a neutral 3rd party arbiter to decide these sorts of things?”
In order for there to be a third party, there would need to be a second party.
The LNC is not a legitimate party to internal state party decisions as to who those parties’ officials are in the first place, so there’s no basis for arbitration of its claims versus those of the actual organization whose sole business that is.
In related news, happy belated birthday JBH.
that’s it; no Meese endorsement for you!
Is there a reason not to use a neutral 3rd party arbiter to decide these sorts of things?