

Procedure for Populating the Judicial Committee under Libertarian Party Bylaws

1. WHAT THIS DOCUMENT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT

No entity is able to rule upon its own legitimacy. Were any committee improperly constituted, any decision by it that it was properly constituted would be void upon its own premise. If it is properly constituted, then such a decision would be unnecessary. **Therefore, this is not a ruling, and this is not a work product of the Judicial Committee.**

What can be done, and is done here, is to explain how this Judicial Committee came to be constituted as it is. This document covers the election of the Judicial Committee for the past 16 years including in 2026, the provisions of Article 8, Section 1 governing vacancies, the arguments against the appointments stated at their strongest, the official documented history of the party in regard to the relevant bylaws, and my personal account of how the Committee proceeded in 2026.

For those looking for a shortcut: look to section 5.1 on unfilled seats becoming vacancies, section 4.1 in the paragraphs discussing 2010 for the adoption history of the sub-quorum vacancy language, and section 5.5 on how appointments are accomplished in that scenario.

2. THE POSTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT: IT EXPLAINS, IT DOES NOT RULE

This opinion is issued by Ken Moellman, in the wake of the 2026 National Convention, for newer delegates and members who are unfamiliar with the longer-term history of the party and with the process when a suspension of the rules does not occur during the course of the election of the Judicial Committee or At-Large Representatives. The purpose of this document is to explain the process, with the associated bylaws and documented party history, by which the Committee filled.

Even without the prohibition on self-legitimization, no such matter is within the Judicial Committee's jurisdiction to opine. The delegates confined the Committee's jurisdiction to the items in bylaws Article 8, Section 2. The Judicial Committee may only act, reactively, and "limited to consideration of only those matters expressly identified as follows," on seven enumerated items: suspension of affiliate parties, suspension of officers, suspension of National Committee members-at-large, voiding of National Committee decisions, challenges to platform planks, challenges to resolutions, and suspension of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.

It is restated again to be absolutely clear: No entity is able to rule upon its own legitimacy, this is not a ruling, and this is not a work product of the Judicial Committee.

3. THE ELECTION AT THE 2026 REGULAR CONVENTION

What follows is an account of what happened, in the order it happened. It rests upon the Party's own recordings, transcribed by hand against the audio, and upon the minutes of the convention. It contains no argument.

3.1 Sunday, May 24, 2026 – before the results

The rule was stated from the floor and confirmed by the chair, before the tally was displayed. A point of inquiry was brought by Mr. Simbro (TX) as to the election procedure *prior* to the announcement of the results: the top seven candidates who receive over 50% are to be elected. The chair confirmed it, and confirmed that the two qualifications operate together: a candidate must have a majority, and among those with a majority, the top seven. Asked whether that was the case here, the chair answered that the convention was about to find out.

3.2 Sunday, May 24, 2026 – the declaration and what followed

The results were displayed and two candidates were declared elected, Avens O'Brien and Ken Moellman. Here are the actual results:

Candidate	Votes	Percent	
Nolan Schmidt	138	22.62%	
Nick Ciesielski	212	34.75%	
Blay Tarnoff	235	38.52%	
Ken Krawchuk	246	40.33%	
Caryn Ann Harlos	205	33.61%	
Avens O'Brien	387	63.44%	*ELECTED*
Andrew Chadderdon	166	27.21%	
Nathan Madden	218	35.74%	
Mark King	79	12.95%	
Hector Roos	215	35.25%	
Marc Montoni	224	36.72%	
Jake Porter	301	49.34%	
Stephan Kinsella	275	45.08%	
Charles Larkin	163	26.72%	
Roger Roots	282	46.23%	
Ken Moellman	373	61.15%	*ELECTED*
Mike Seebeck	267	43.77%	
Write-Ins	9	1.48%	
NOTA	2	0.33%	
TOTALS:	610	100%	

What followed, in order:

1. The chair announced that there were two winners, announced them by name, and followed that “those two winners get to fill the rest of the vacancies on the JC.” He then said that the orders of the day was the Chair’s race.
2. A **point of order** from Mr. Bracco that the elections should proceed to a second round of balloting. The **chair ruled against**: “Nope, I’m ruling that we don’t.”
3. Mr. Starr was recognized to make a **motion to suspend the rules** so that “we can have a vote for the next five ranking votes and we just approve that with a 2/3rds vote” and boos are heard in the hall.
4. Mr. Starr noted his motion had not been seconded and altered his motion to suspend the rules to conduct “a second round of voting, so we can decide who these other five people are, instead of only letting two people choose the other five.” It was **moved by Mr. Starr, seconded, and put** upon a show of tokens. The chair declared: “Doesn’t look like two-thirds to me.” **The motion failed.** (*The minutes record the same motion as having failed by a show of hands.*)
5. A **point of order** upon approval voting and plurality, raised by Mr. Ciesielski of Pennsylvania. The chair ruled it **not well taken**. During cross-talk between the chair and Mr. Ciesielski, he **appealed the ruling twice**; on each occasion the chair answered that this was “not a conversation,” and **neither appeal was put**.
6. A request for the orders of the day, made by Mr. Sarwark. The chair answered that the convention was on to the chair’s nominations.
7. An **appeal** from the ruling of the chair, by Mr. Bracco, upon the grounds Mr. Ciesielski had stated. The chair asked what those grounds were and then said: “No, it’s dilatory. We’re going to nominations.” The appeal likely had enough support to be seconded, but it **was not put**.
8. A point of privilege from Mr. Chadderdon, asking “why is the chair denying the body the right to choose the Judicial Committee.” He was not recognized. Shouts of “orders of the day” are heard in the hall.
9. One item of current business interceding, a delegate requested that the chair resign; the request was denied; that delegate appealed; and the chair again answered “dilatory” and moved to the next microphone.
10. Question followed upon by Mr. Sceniak on whether NOTA votes had been included in the total, and the chair confirmed that they were.
11. Another question followed from Mr. Callier to confirm the convention rules provide for the selection of Judicial Committee members in the same manner as electing At-Large LNC members. The chair confirmed that was his understanding.
12. After nominations for Chair had opened, and one nomination had been taken, Mr. Starr asked a **request for information** on whether approval voting requires multiple rounds under the parliamentary authority; the chair answered that the Bylaws were clear and that he **had already ruled**. Shout of “orders of the day” is again heard in the hall.

My personal opinion is that the initial challenge to the chair's ruling made by Mr. Ciesielski should have been heard by the body, but subsequent actions, specifically the motion by Mr. Starr, did give the body the ability to weigh in. When given that opportunity, the body chose not to do so.

3.3 Monday, May 25, 2026 – the question returns three times

The matter came back on the following day, in three distinct forms. The body again had the opportunity to weigh in, and it deliberately chose not to do so while also fully informed on the consequences of not doing so.

First – a resolution to let the delegates elect the remainder

During a period of business where only resolutions were in order, Mr. Bracco **moved to suspend the rules to consider a resolution** entitled *Resolution to Allow the Delegates Elect the Entire Judicial Committee*, which would have had the delegates elect those standing third through seventh in the vote to fill the vacancies. It was moved and seconded, and the chair at first considered it in order. An appeal followed, and the question was put whether the chair's ruling should be sustained.

Mr. Sarwark then raised the objection which decided it: that a resolution is not a motion because a resolution states the sense of the body, and cannot do the work of suspending the rules. The chair consulted the parliamentarian and ruled the point well taken. **The resolution was declared out of order** upon the form of the instrument, and not upon its substance.

Second – a vote upon a second ballot

The convention returned to a **motion to suspend the rules** made by Ms. Purcell¹ in order to go into a second ballot for the Judicial Committee. Mr. Dixon had a request for information regarding who the nominees would be. The chair explained that two had been elected, that there are seven seats, and that a second ballot would determine the other five, from the same nominees.

The **motion was put** upon tokens, and was declared to have **failed** with the chair declaring "It doesn't look like two-thirds." A **division was called**, the delegates rose, and the chair declared: "Not two-thirds." **The motion still failed.**

¹ The recording of this session started late and did not include the making of the motion. Ms. Purcell was found to have made the motion in the minutes.

Third – a motion to seat the next five

Mr. Chadderdon **moved to suspend the rules** and have the body seat the five unelected candidates standing highest in the first round, whom he named. The chair **ruled the motion not substantially different** from the one brought after the Judicial Committee election, and therefore not in order.

Mr. Chadderdon **appealed**, and the appeal was **seconded and put**. He argued that his was a different motion – to elect those five individuals, as against the earlier motion to elect by plurality. The question was put upon whether the ruling of the chair should be sustained, first upon tokens and then upon a counted rising vote.

The ruling of the chair was sustained: 285 to 192. **The appeal failed.**

3.4 Controversy on election rules

The controversy over whether our rules require a second round of balloting stems from the wording of “Rule 8: Election of Officers and National Committee” in the Convention Special Rules of Order.

It has been argued and held that the specific language of Section 2(c) forecloses multiple rounds of voting:

When all delegations have submitted their votes, the Chair shall declare the voting closed. The top five candidates receiving a majority vote of the ballots cast shall be elected. Tie votes affecting the outcome shall be decided by lot.

As a note, this language was adopted when Approval Voting was adopted as our method of election. The previous rules outlined that the top-five were elected no matter what. There was explicit finality. Prior to the adoption of Approval Voting, the top-five were elected regardless of a majority vote:

Those five candidates receiving the highest vote totals shall be declared elected. If a tie vote affecting the outcome of the election occurs, another ballot for the remaining offices shall be held with each delegate allowed to cast as many votes as there are offices to fill.

Clarity codified into the Convention Rules, in favor of either position, would be appreciated but must be left to a future convention body to resolve. In Section 1(c), such clarity is provided for officers:

In cases where no candidate receives a majority, runoff votes will be held, dropping the candidate with the fewest votes after each ballot.

If the body wants to fill all of the positions through multiple rounds of voting, then a solution could be as simple as striking Section 2(c) entirely, and moving Section 1(a), “For

each office, a majority vote will be necessary for election,” to its own primary section. This would cause the default language of RONR to clearly stand as the authority.

If the body wants to only have one round of voting, it should state that explicitly, which could be done by replacing Section 2(c) with “there shall be only one round of balloting” or similar language.

3.5 The account in short

The delegates were not left to infer the operation of Article 8, Section 1. They were told that two elected members would fill the remaining vacancies, on each occasion the matter came before them.

The Starr motion called for *“a second round of voting, so we can decide who these other five people are, instead of only letting two people choose the other five”* and the wording of the Bracco resolution began *“Whereas Article 8, section 1 of the bylaws of the Libertarian Party state that the remaining members of the judicial committee, and not the delegates, fill any vacant positions on the judicial committee ...”* All of this occurred prior to the Purcell motion – the last attempt to suspend the rules and elect more members to the Judicial Committee that was heard – laying to rest any concern that the outcome of the Judicial Committee election was anything except what the body wanted.

The direct questions put to the convention body failed. The Starr motion was put and failed. The Purcell motion was put, failed, division was called, and still failed.

On the final occasion, the appeal from Chadderdon reached a counted vote of the body. The delegates sustained the chair, 285 to 192, that the motion was not substantially different from one already decided. The delegates who voted to overturn the chair numbered 192, constituting 40.3% of those voting. A motion to suspend the rules would have required two-thirds – 318 of the 477 delegates then voting. The ruling did not deprive the convention of a result it would otherwise have reached. *(I note that a vote to sustain a ruling that a motion is not substantially different from one already decided is a procedural judgment, and does not establish the view of those delegates on the merits of seating additional members.)*

The convention body did have three opportunities – two direct and one indirect – to fill the remaining seats. Given multiple explanations and votes, the body knew what it was doing. The convention body deliberately chose to leave the seats unfilled in convention and left the seats to be filled under the vacancy clause in Article 8, Section 1.

The convention rules are sufficiently vague that controversy may arise over the election process itself, leaving it to either the chair to make a ruling and the body to overturn that ruling, or a suspension of the rules to explicitly act to continue to another ballot. The latter has been our tradition.

4. VACANCY RULES SINCE 2010; APPROVAL VOTING SINCE 2014

4.1 2026 is a normal outcome when rules are not suspended

Some believe that 2026 was an aberration. The Party's own convention minutes show that it was the rule working as it has worked since the delegates adopted it.

2010 – the rule to fill vacancies on the Judicial Committee is adopted at the National Convention, and the intention behind it is recorded in the minutes of that convention (*Minutes of the 2010 Regular Convention, pp. 15–16*). The stated object was to ensure that the Judicial Committee should never be left unable to render decisions so long as one member remained.

RONR 56:68 directs that an ambiguous provision be read in light of its original intent where that intent can be ascertained, and here it can.

The 2010 record is decisive, because the problem the delegates were solving is precisely the problem now said to defeat the clause. The Bylaws and Rules Committee brought the proposal forward under the heading “Judicial Committee Vacancies (recommended 10–0)” and stated the difficulty in these words:

Problem: There is no mechanism for filling a vacancy on the Judicial Committee. If three members were to resign prior to the end of their terms, there would be no legal way for the committee to meet to hear a case.

Solution: Allow the remaining members of the Judicial Committee to fill a vacancy until the next Regular Convention.

The proposal passed, and the sentence it inserted is the one in force today. The complete language, after amendment in 2010, reads:

*The Judicial Committee shall be composed of seven Party members elected at each Regular Convention, and any five members shall constitute a quorum. No member of the National Committee may be a member of the Judicial Committee. The members of the Judicial Committee shall select the Chair of the Judicial Committee. The Judicial Committee shall take office immediately upon the close of the Regular Convention at which elected and shall serve until the final adjournment of the next Regular Convention. All Judicial Committee members shall have been Party members at least four years at the time of their selection. **The remaining members of the Judicial Committee shall appoint new members if vacancies occur, such appointees to serve until the final adjournment of the next Regular Convention.***

And the language, as it exists today, reads substantively the same, with the updated language for four-year terms adopted in 2018:

*The Judicial Committee shall be composed of seven Party members elected at each regular nonpresidential convention and any five members shall constitute a quorum. No member of the National Committee may be a member of the Judicial Committee. The members of the Judicial Committee shall select the Chair of the Judicial Committee. The Judicial Committee shall take office immediately upon the close of the regular non-presidential convention at which elected and shall serve until the final adjournment of the next regular non-presidential convention. All Judicial Committee members shall have been Party members at least four years at the time of their selection. **The remaining members of the Judicial Committee shall appoint new members if vacancies occur, such appointees to serve until the final adjournment of the next regular nonpresidential convention.** Should all Judicial Committee positions be vacant, an Intervening convention may fill such vacancies.*

Read that problem statement against the objection. The drafters were not describing an inconvenience. They were describing a Committee below quorum and therefore unable to meet at all, and they said so in terms: “no legal way for the committee to meet.” The remedy they proposed, and the delegates adopted, was to empower “the remaining members” to fill the seats.

Fixing the issue with mid-term vacancies was top-of-mind at the 2010 national convention. In the same 2010 Bylaws package the delegates provided for vacancies upon the Convention Committees – Credentials, Platform and the rest – in these terms: “Ranked alternates may be named by the appointing bodies to fill any vacancies or absences in the Convention Committees.”

2014 - the rule for approval voting is adopted, and suspended the same day. The convention amended Convention Rule 8 to introduce approval voting, in the words still in force: “The top five candidates receiving a majority vote of the ballots cast shall be elected. Tie votes affecting the outcome shall be decided by lot.” A delegate asked whether it took effect at that convention and the chair answered that it did, bylaw changes taking effect immediately absent a proviso. On the first ballot under it, four candidates obtained majorities and two tied at 45.48% for the fifth seat.

A delegate then moved “to suspend the requirements of Convention Rule 8.2” and to fill the fifth position by coin toss between the two, “though they did not receive majority votes.” The motion passed, and the seat was filled by lot.

A point of order was raised that candidates receiving less than a majority are not to be elected; the answer recorded in the minutes is that the majority requirement sits in a Convention Rule rather than in the Bylaws, and that the motion before the body was to

suspend it. *(I raised the point of order recorded in the 2014 minutes; the disclosure is at Section 9.)*

The same convention then elected a Judicial Committee under the same new rule, and filled every seat. The minutes record why the rule reached that election at all: Convention Rule 9 requires that “nominations and elections for members of the Judicial Committee shall be conducted in the same manner as specified for at-large members of the National Committee,” and “the amendment of Rule 8.2 required approval voting for the at-large election.” On a single ballot all seven candidates obtained majorities – though narrowly, the lowest two standing at 50.49%, or 104 of 206 ballots cast. The rule filled the Committee at its first application.

And the convention was told, that day, what would follow if it did not. A delegate asked “what would happen if the convention adjourned without electing a Judicial Committee.” The presiding officer answered that the terms of the sitting Committee would end, and that the Party “would have no Judicial Committee for the next term.” Delegates were separately urged not to vote for none-of-the-above “lest it prevent a Judicial Committee from being elected.” In 2018 that is what happened.

That exchange, on the day the rule was born, is the whole of this question. The rule means what it says; a candidate without a majority is not elected; and to seat one anyway the convention must suspend the rule. Nobody in 2014 supposed otherwise, and the delegates have not amended the sentence since.

2016 - the convention adjourns before the count. The convention adjourned at 12:47 p.m., and the results of both elections were announced after adjournment. In the Judicial Committee election three candidates obtained majorities – 59.178%, 52.877% and 50.411% – and the fourth stood at 40.000%. In the at-large election two obtained majorities and “[t]hree additional seats remained vacant.” Because the body had adjourned sine die, no motion to suspend could be made; and the three members elected thereafter filled the remaining four seats by the electronic mail ballot set out above.

Examination of party records shows that in 2016 the same process of appointment was used post-convention. Additionally, a similar rejection of the “losing” candidates was determined by that committee. In an email dated Thursday, June 2, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Gary Johnson of Texas (specifically, not Gary Johnson of New Mexico) wrote to then LNC Secretary Alicia Mattson:

Dear Alicia Mattson,

Please post this message online on the LNC Business list:

The Judicial Committee is supposed to have seven members. Only three received a majority in the approval voting process at the 2016 national convention.

The three members of the Judicial Committee elected by the delegates, Alicia Dearn, Gary Johnson of Texas, and Chuck Moulton, have communicated by email.

We have ruled unanimously that, as the “remaining members” of the committee, we have the authority to fill vacancies, although we are less than the quorum of five specified in the bylaws.

We have decided informally to reject, by 1 to 2, the idea of filling the vacancies with the next four vote getters.

We have decided unanimously to fill the vacancies with four individuals who were not nominated at the convention and therefore were not “disapproved” of by a majority of the delegates in the approval voting process.

We have voted unanimously by email ballot to fill the vacancies with Michael Badnarik, John Buttrick, Bill Hall, and Rob Latham.

Alicia Dearn
Gary Johnson
Chuck Moulton

2018 - the same convention sequence, and a worse result. The Judicial Committee terms of office are extended to four years. Then the convention adjourned without tabulation of the Judicial Committee ballots which “were tabulated and the results announced” later in the evening, following the National Committee’s post-convention meeting. No candidate obtained a majority: the highest stood at 40.719%. The at-large election of the same convention was completed “pursuant to the motion adopted just prior to adjournment” – that is, the delegates acted upon the at-large election before adjourning sine die and did not do so for the Judicial Committee.

The consequence in 2018 was that no Judicial Committee was constituted at all, and section 7 below is accordingly not a hypothesis.

2020 - the delegates legislate upon precisely this, and say why. At the second sitting of the 2020 Regular Convention the Bylaws and Convention Rules Committee brought forward three proposals:

1. To elect the Judicial Committee by regions and selected in the same manner as Regional Representatives of the LNC. It failed, 71 to 278.
2. Consideration then proceeded to the minority proposal, which had been drawn to be taken up only if the first was not adopted, and which added to Article 8, Section 1 the sentence: “Should all Judicial Committee positions be vacant, an intervening convention may fill such vacancies.” Debate was closed 296 to 84, and the amendment passed, 256 to 112.

3. Later, delegates declined even to consider a change to the bylaws to enact what is now urged by some as already the status quo. A motion was made to suspend the rules to take up Bylaws Proposal 18, “Multi-Round Voting for Judicial Committee and LNC At-Large.” The motion to suspend failed, 182 to 124. The proposal was never reached.

The first and second proposals, above, were brought in response to the failure to elect anyone to the Judicial Committee at the 2018 national convention. The body chose to adopt the minority report on that item, permitting an intervening convention body the ability to add people to the Judicial Committee where there were none; no remaining members to fill vacancies. This is the most direct support the Judicial Committee’s appointment action has, and it is in the drafters’ own words. The rationale provided by the Bylaws and Convention Rules Committee to the convention body, as documented in the convention minutes, explained:

The existing rule allows Judicial Committee vacancies to be filled by the remaining members of the Judicial Committee. If, however, all Judicial Committee positions are vacant, there are no remaining members to fill the vacancies. Under our parliamentary authority, the principles of interpretation applied to such a situation say that since the rule specifies a particular appointment process, it precludes any other process such as an intervening convention filling the vacancies. This addition will allow a convention to act when all positions are vacant for whatever reason.

Four things follow from that paragraph, and the Committee did not have to supply any of them.

First, the drafters read the appointment clause as specifying a particular process – which is the canon of construction discussed below, stated by the Party’s own drafting body.

Second, they read it as exclusive: it “precludes any other process.”

Third, and decisively, they thought an amendment necessary to let a convention act when there were no remaining members – which presupposes that where there *are* remaining members, however few, the clause already operates and no amendment is needed.

Fourth, they recognized that any number of members could fill vacancies within the committee.

The delegates then adopted that reasoning by adopting the amendment.

So the provision answers the total failure and only the total failure. Having seen what a single ballot can produce, the delegates supplied a remedy for the case of no members remaining and left the case of some members remaining exactly where it already was – with “the remaining members,” who “shall appoint.” A body which addresses the one case and

does not disturb the clause governing the other has not overlooked the other. It has left it to the clause that already governs it – knowing, from 2016, that the remnant might be as few as three.

2022 - every seat filled. An attempt to suspend the rules to lower the bar was stopped based on the timing of the motion. At the 2022 Regular Convention all seven Judicial Committee seats were filled on a single ballot, the successful candidates receiving between 63.51% and 73.20% of the ballots cast; all five at-large seats were likewise filled on one ballot. No second round was needed for either, and none was held.

In the course of the at-large balloting, a delegate moved to suspend the rules to remove the majority requirement to be elected. Another raised a point of order “that changing voting thresholds in the middle of a vote can affect how delegates vote and is improper.” The chair ruled the point of order well taken, and the motion was not put. (*Minutes of the 2022 Regular Convention.*) (*I presided during this portion of the 2022 Regular Convention and made the ruling recorded above; the disclosure, and the reasons it changes nothing, are at Section 9.*)

Two things follow, and the second is the more useful. The episode confirms that the majority requirement is understood to be real – a delegate seeking to seat candidates without majorities moved to suspend it, which is what one does with a rule that binds. And it identifies the one limit the convention has placed upon that course: the motion came while the voting was already in progress, and a threshold altered mid-vote changes the meaning of votes already cast. The rule may be suspended; it may not be suspended out from under ballots already in the delegates’ hands.

2024 - the rule suspended in advance, and five members seated as LNC At-Large Representative with no majority at all. At the 2024 Regular Convention, immediately upon the close of nominations for at-large representatives, a delegate “moved to suspend the rules to elect the top five vote recipients (plurality) for LNC At-Large Representative.” The motion passed. On the ballot that followed, not one of the five successful candidates obtained a majority – the highest stood at 48.76% of the 804 ballots cast, and the fifth at 45.40%. They were nonetheless declared elected.

The Secretary of the Party footnoted the result, and the footnote is the plainest statement of this rule to be found anywhere in the Party’s records:

This election was determined by a plurality, rather than a majority of the ballots cast, due to a prior suspension of the rules.

That sentence supplies, from the Party’s own minutes, every proposition this document has reasoned to. The rule requires a majority. A plurality result is a departure from it. And the departure is lawful only “due to a prior suspension of the rules” – prior, because 2022 had established that the suspension cannot come once the ballots are out. An officer of the

Party recording an at-large election in 2024 thought it necessary to explain why the winners had been seated without majorities. There would have been nothing to explain if a majority were not required.

2026 - The delegates in 2026 exercised the suspension power for the election of the At-Large Representatives, and withheld it from the election of the Judicial Committee. They were told, before declining, what the consequence would be for not suspending the rules to conduct another round of voting for the Judicial Committee: “letting only 2 people choose the other 5.”

The body acted deliberately and decisively, with full knowledge that two people would be appointing the other five. There was no doubt what the outcome would be without a suspension of the rules. And that outcome follows with the actual bylaws of the party as they have been interpreted since the adoption of Approval Voting in 2014. Attempting to re-litigate the matter now, outside of convention, would be improper and a violation of the will expressed by the delegates at the 2026 national convention.

4.2 What the occasions establish, stated narrowly

The rule sometimes fills every seat and sometimes does not, and which it does depends upon how the delegates vote. It has filled the Judicial Committee entirely twice – in 2014, at its first application, all seven upon majorities as narrow as 50.49%; and in 2022, all seven upon majorities of 63.51% to 73.20%, with all five at-large seats filled the same day. It has fallen short three times – 2016 (three of seven), 2018 (none), and 2026 (two of seven). In the at-large elections it filled four of five in 2014, two of five in 2016, all five in 2022, and none of five in 2024, where the seats were filled by plurality under a suspension adopted before the ballot.

The rule is therefore neither unworkable nor self-defeating. It produced a complete Committee on the first occasion it was ever used and again four years ago.

The 2026 result is not a malfunction of the rule, and - despite my personal disagreement with some of the rulings made by the chair after the completion of the election - it is not attributable to any ruling of any chair. It is what the ballots contained, and what the delegates chose as the final result.

5. THE VACANCIES AND THE APPOINTMENTS

5.1 The seats left unfilled at the close of the convention were vacancies

Whether a second round of balloting was owed does not bear on this question. RONR 46:45 provides that where an assembly does not complete an election, “if the term of office extends until a successor is elected ... failure to complete an election leaves the incumbent, if any, in office. Otherwise, a vacancy in office arises.”

Article 8, Section 1 fixes a terminus and stops. Members “serve until the final adjournment” of the next electing convention; the Section contains no “until a successor is elected.” The second branch therefore applies, and the five seats unfilled at the close of the 2026 convention were vacancies from that moment.

The delegates have already legislated on that premise. In 2020 they provided for the case in which “all Judicial Committee positions be vacant” — the condition produced by the 2018 election, at which no candidate reached a majority (*see Section 4.1*). Seats unfilled at election were treated as vacant seats then, and the same characterization governs a partial failure.

5.2 The objection, at its strongest

The argument is that Article 8, Section 1 fixes a quorum of five; that the vacancy clause identifies who appoints but does not dispense with the quorum; that RONR 25:10 places quorum requirements among the protections of absentees which cannot be suspended, and that a body which does not set its own quorum cannot dispense with it; that under RONR 23:6 the resulting breach continues so long as the appointees hold office; that inability to function may be the intended consequence of a quorum requirement, the remedy for an unworkable bylaw being amendment rather than interpretation; and that the 2016 episode is prior practice which cannot amend contrary written language.

25:10 Rules protecting absentees cannot be suspended, even by unanimous consent or an actual unanimous vote, because the absentees do not consent to such suspension. For example, the rules requiring the presence of a quorum, restricting business transacted at a special meeting to that mentioned in the call of the meeting, and requiring previous notice of a proposed amendment to the bylaws protect absentees, if there are any, and cannot be suspended when any member is absent.

I accept RONR 25:10 without qualification. A quorum requirement is among the protections that may not be suspended, and a body which did not fix its own quorum cannot dispense with it.

RONR 3:3, 3:4, 40:1, and 40:9 speak more directly to the quorum issue raised.

3:3 Quorum of Members. The minimum number of members who must be present at the meetings of a deliberative assembly for business to be validly transacted is the quorum of the assembly. The requirement of a quorum is a protection against totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an unduly small number of persons. In both houses of Congress, the quorum is a majority of the members, by the United States Constitution. Such a quorum is appropriate in legislative bodies but too large in most voluntary societies. In an ordinary society, therefore, a provision of the bylaws should specify the number of members that

shall constitute a quorum, which should approximate the largest number that can be depended on to attend any meeting except in very bad weather or other extremely unfavorable conditions. In the absence of such a provision in a society or assembly whose real membership can be accurately determined at any time—that is, in a body having an enrolled membership composed only of persons who maintain their status as members in a prescribed manner—the quorum is a majority of the entire membership, by the common parliamentary law.

3:4 In the meetings of a convention, unless the bylaws of the organization provide otherwise, the quorum is a majority of the delegates who have been registered at the convention as in attendance, irrespective of whether some may have departed. In a mass meeting, or in a regular or properly called meeting of an organization whose bylaws do not prescribe a quorum and whose membership is loosely determined (as, for example, in many church congregations or alumni associations), there is no minimum number of members who must be present for the valid transaction of business, or—as it is usually expressed—the quorum consists of those who attend the meeting.

40:1 As indicated in 3:3, a quorum in an assembly is the number of members (see definition, 1:4) who must be present in order that business can be validly transacted. The quorum refers to the number of members present, not to the number actually voting on a particular question.

40:9 The prohibition against transacting business in the absence of a quorum cannot be waived even by unanimous consent, and a notice (10:44–51) cannot be validly given. If there is important business that should not be delayed until the next regular meeting, the assembly should fix the time for an adjourned meeting and then adjourn. If, instead, the members present take action informally in the absence of a quorum, they do so at their own risk. Although the assembly can later ratify their action (10:54–57), it is under no obligation to do so.

5.3 “The remaining members ... shall appoint”

Article 8, Section 1 provides that “[t]he remaining members of the Judicial Committee shall appoint new members if vacancies occur.”

It is mandatory. The delegates did not say the remaining members *may* appoint; they said they shall. It is a duty.

It is addressed to whatever is left. “Remaining members” means the members who remain; the clause contains no floor, and it is by its nature directed at the situation in which seats are vacant. A duty imposed upon a remnant cannot be conditioned upon the remnant being large enough to constitute a quorum, because it would then be unperformable in precisely the circumstances it exists to address – and the more vacancies there were, the more certainly the mandatory duty could not be discharged.

And the “remaining members” language was intentionally created to solve the problem. We know from the 2010 convention minutes that the language was specifically passed to resolve the issue of a “less than five” issue (*Section 4.1*).

5.4 A “Broken Committee” is an incorrect interpretation

If the plain language and known historical context are to be ignored, one alternative reading is that the Bylaws simultaneously command a duty and forbid its performance. RONR 56:68(1) requires that an ambiguous provision be interpreted, if possible, in harmony with the other bylaws, and a reading which renders a mandatory duty incapable of performance is not a harmonious one.

Two further and independent reasons why the quorum rule does not reach this clause are given below – the authority Article 13 supplies, and a canon of construction – and neither depends upon this one.

5.5 Article 13 and RONR 9:34 resolve the potential conflict

An electronic mail ballot is not a meeting. Article 13 creates a procedure for electronic mail ballots as a means to conduct business outside of a business meeting.

ARTICLE 13: ELECTRONIC MAIL BALLOTS

Boards and committees may transact business by electronic mail. The Chair or Secretary shall send out electronic mail ballots on any question submitted by the Chair or co-sponsored by at least 1/5 of the members of the board or committee. The period for voting on a question shall remain open for seven days, unless all members have cast votes, or have stated an intention to abstain or be absent during the voting period, by electronic mail to the entire board or committee. Votes from alternates will be counted, in accordance with previously defined ranked order, in the absence of the corresponding committee member(s). The outcome of each motion shall be announced promptly and recorded in the minutes of the next meeting. The number of votes required for passage of any motion shall be the same as that required during a meeting. Motions dispensed through electronic mail ballots satisfy the requirement of giving previous notice.

Electronic *meetings* require express authorization under the parliamentary authority. And an exchange in writing is a different thing altogether, and RONR 9:34 says so:

“It is important to understand that, regardless of the technology used, the opportunity for simultaneous aural communication is essential to the deliberative character of the meeting. ***Therefore, a group that attempts to conduct the deliberative process in writing (such as by postal mail, e-mail, ‘chat rooms,’ or fax) – which is not recommended – does not constitute a deliberative assembly.***”

And our own bylaws treat electronic meetings separately from electronic mail ballots, in Article 12. That article does not enter into specific details as the rules of order are otherwise retained from the normal order. This is not a dispute over terminology but an explicit distinction between electronic meetings and electronic balloting.

A quorum is the number of members who must be present *at a meeting* to transact business. The concept is defined by reference to a meeting and has no application apart from one. Article 13 business is not transacted at a meeting: RONR 9:34 states that a body attempting the deliberative process in writing “does not constitute a deliberative assembly.”

Because neither the Bylaws nor the parliamentary authority treat an electronic mail ballot as a meeting, no quorum requirement attaches to one. Article 13 supplies the procedure instead: the question is put; the ballot remains open for seven days or until all members have voted or stated an intention to abstain or be absent; and the threshold for passage is that which would apply at a meeting of those casting a vote.

Article 13 is a grant by the delegates, in the Bylaws, of a mode of transacting business that is not a meeting. It is the authority the objection asks the Committee to identify. **Quorum requirements do not apply to an electronic mail ballot.** An email ballot for the filling of vacancies requires only a majority of those voting.

One cannot suspend what does not apply. The question is not whether the five-member quorum may be set aside – it may not – but whether it is engaged by a mode of acting the Bylaws separately authorize and which involves no meeting at all. It is not.

The Committee did not suspend the quorum, and does not claim the power to. The two members elected by the delegates appointed the remaining five members by that mechanism – electronic mail ballots.

5.6 Article 13 expressly contemplates absence

Were there doubt, the text of Article 13 resolves it. The provision closes voting after seven days “unless all members have cast votes, or have stated an intention to abstain or be absent during the voting period,” and it directs that votes from alternates be counted “in the absence of the corresponding committee member(s).” A provision whose own mechanics are built around members being absent is not one that conditions action upon a quorum of those present.

Nor does Article 13’s threshold sentence import one. It provides that “the number of votes required for passage of any motion shall be the same as that required during a meeting.” That imports the ***fraction*** – majority, two-thirds – and not the conditions of assembly.

5.7 And a canon of construction points the same way, independently of Article 13

Party records prove that the “remaining members” clause was written specifically for the sub-quorum case; that is its entire occasion. A construction under which “the remaining members” may act only where five of them remain would return the Party to the very position the 2010 delegates legislated to escape (a Committee unable to meet and unable to repair itself) and would leave the amendment with nothing to do in the only circumstance its authors described. A provision adopted to solve a problem is not to be read so as to reinstate it.

The contrast answers the objection without more. If “the remaining members shall appoint” were meant to operate only while a quorum survived, the Judicial Committee would have needed some outside filler for the sub-quorum case – and the delegates plainly knew how to provide one, having just done so. They did not do it here. They gave the remnant the power instead, which is what the clause says.

So the objection’s central demand is answered on its own terms. The Committee was recently asked to identify affirmatively the provision authorizing two members to transact appointment business despite the fixed quorum.

The committee is not permitted to make such a determination under RONR. So I will give the rationale as a member who has studied the issue.

The provision is the vacancy clause of Article 8, Section 1 itself. It is not an exception implied by the Committee, nor a necessity invoked to excuse an unauthorized act; it is a specific direction, in the same sentence of the same Section as the quorum rule, telling a depleted Committee what it must do.

The parliamentary authority states the canon: the specific controls over the general (*RONR* 56:68(3)). It points to the same reading of Article 8, Section 1 that this document reaches upon Article 13 alone.

5.8 The harmonious reading where all three provisions operate

Provision	What it does	Left standing
Article 8, Section 1: “any five ... shall constitute a quorum”	Fixes the number who must be present at a <i>meeting</i>	Yes. The Committee cannot meet with fewer than five
Article 8, Section 1: “the remaining members ... shall appoint”	Imposes a mandatory duty on whatever members remain	Yes. Performed

Provision	What it does	Left standing
Article 13: “may transact business by electronic mail”	Supplies a mode of acting that is <i>not a meeting</i>	Yes. Used to perform “shall appoint” in 8.1

And on the canon stated immediately above, the quorum rule would not reach the appointment of members to fill vacancies even if Article 13 did not exist – the specific provision governing the specific circumstance. The two answers are independent, and the Committee has both.

Nothing is read out, and nothing is suspended. The construction the objection proposes, by contrast, would read Article 13 out of the Bylaws whenever a body most needs it and would render Article 8, Section 1’s mandatory appointment duty unperformable.

[5.9 RONR 23:6 falls with its premise – and the tenure of the appointees rests on the Bylaws, not on the appointing act](#)

The continuing-breach argument is contingent: a breach continues only if there was a breach. I find no violation of Article 8, Section 1, and 23:6 is therefore not engaged.

The objection is that the election was incomplete, and therefore a continuing breach exists. This is incorrect. Even on the most generous reading of the objection, RONR 23:6 does not list an incomplete election among its continuing breaches. RONR treats an incomplete election as something to be completed as soon as possible, and the convention body had multiple opportunities to do so. When it declined, the Bylaws supplied what follows, and the remaining members discharged the duty Article 8, Section 1 places upon them without delay.

The objection reasons that the appointees claim office because of those acts today, so that every hearing, vote and decision continues to rely on the disputed authority. That is not how the Bylaws constitute their tenure. Article 8, Section 1 provides that vacancies are filled by appointment, “such appointees to serve until the final adjournment of the next regular non-presidential convention.” The appointment is a completed act; what follows from it is a term of office fixed by the Bylaws. The appointees hold office under Article 8, Section 1, not by a continuing exercise of anyone’s will.

It follows that they do not serve at the pleasure of those who appointed them, and cannot be unmade by them. Article 8, Section 1 provides no power in the Committee, or in any part of it, to remove a member. A body whose members cannot be removed by those who selected them is not one in which the selectors retain control, whatever the arithmetic of the selection.

5.10 The concentration point, acknowledged

An objector observes that five of the seven members now sitting derive their seats from an act of two. The observation is accurate. The objector suggests that the two members now carry a measure of control over the other five (presumably through a motion to rescind or reconsider nomination or election).

But the Bylaws do not create two classes of committee membership. As compared to elected members, the appointed members have identical tenure, identical voting rights, identical standing, and identical qualification requirements. There is no provisional status, no lesser class, and no continuing dependence upon or subservience to those who appointed them. An appointed member's term is the same as an elected member's: they "shall serve until the final adjournment of the next regular non-presidential convention." Once appointed, they are treated on equal footing, with no mechanism to remove a member of the committee permitted, under the bylaws.

That matters to the concentration point, because concentration implies control. Five members selected by two would be a concentration of power if the two could direct or unseat the five. They cannot. Once appointed, the five hold office on the same terms as the two, for the same fixed period, and answerable to no one within the Committee.

And the possibility is in any event one the delegates intentionally created. Article 8, Section 1 intentionally commits the filling of vacancies to the remaining members without a floor, and the convention which produced this remnant was asked three times to fill the seats itself and declined. A structure that permits a small remnant to appoint is a structure the delegates adopted and have left unamended through eight subsequent conventions, while amending other closely-related items. If it should be otherwise, the remedy is the one the objection itself identifies: amendment by the delegates. It is not available to the Committee, which may not amend the Bylaws and does not propose to.

5.11 The term runs to 2030, and no convention before then can reach it

Article 8, Section 1 provides that appointees "serve until the final adjournment of the next regular nonpresidential convention" — the same terminus it fixes for elected members. That is the 2030 convention.

RONR 46:45 permits an assembly that has not completed an election to do so "at any time until the expiration of the term the election is to fill." No convention with power to elect this Committee meets inside that window. Article 8, Section 1 assigns the election to regular nonpresidential conventions, and 2028 is not one. Article 16 subordinates the parliamentary authority to the Bylaws.

The 2020 sentence does not supply the power either. It reaches an intervening convention only where all positions are vacant, as in 2018. After the 2026 appointments, none are.

Nor is the question one a floor motion can reach. A bylaw is not suspendable unless it is in the nature of a rule of order (*RONR 25:7*), and a provision fixing the composition and terms of a standing committee is not. The route is amendment, which requires two-thirds — not suspension, which is unavailable at any margin.

Barring resignation, or amendment of the Bylaws by a future convention, the Committee's seven seats are filled for terms running to the final adjournment of the 2030 convention.

6. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR THE 2026 VACANCIES

The criteria for filling the vacancies were settled prior to any appointment being considered, so as to avoid even the mere appearance of criteria fashioned to produce a particular result. The two elected members also agreed upon a period of delay immediately following the convention, so that the appointments would not be made in the atmosphere of the convention that had just closed.

The criteria applied were these:

- (a) the person was a member of the Party for at least four years (bylaws-required);
- (b) the person does not currently serve on the LNC (bylaws-required);
- (c) the person had not been defeated in the ballot for the Judicial Committee at the most recent regular convention, as any candidate receiving under a majority of the ballots cast had lost the election;
- (d) the person had previously been elected to a national position by a majority vote at a national convention; and
- (e) the person was not recently engaged in intra-party factional disputes, and was therefore unlikely to bring a settled disposition to the questions the Committee decides.

The first four were public criteria, while the fifth was applied as weighting. And those criteria narrowed the field considerably. The five members appointed are all long-standing life members: two former national Chairs (Gingell, Neale) and three former members of the National Committee (Dixon, Goldstein, Moulton), the last of whom has served on the Committee for several terms. Each appointment was agreed upon by both of the members the delegates had elected, via email ballot.

7. IF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE COULD NOT APPOINT AND FUNCTION

I have previously opined on this issue, but that analysis was written before I had gone back through the Party's records. Nothing here rests upon it, and it is cited here and in section 9.5 only for full transparency.

A construction where “the remaining members” of a Judicial Committee reduced below five members were not empowered to fill the vacancies would indeed render the committee unable to function, but **it would not abolish the Committee**. Two people, unable to fill vacancies, would still make up the committee, while the bylaws would simultaneously require the committee to act, but also forbid it from acting.

It has been suggested that if the Judicial Committee is unable to act that any matter, that would otherwise be able to be referred, should be resolved in the appellant’s favor. The proposed remedy contradicts its own premise: in such a scenario, the Judicial Committee would also be unable to find for either party.

First, the committee exists. It is a bylaws-mandated standing committee, defined in Article 8 of the Libertarian Party bylaws.

Second, a bylaws-mandated committee that exists but is unable to function continues to exist but is unable to take action.

Third, the bylaws already speak to what happens in the case of inaction by the Judicial Committee in most circumstances where it is empowered to act:

“Failure of the Judicial Committee to rule within 30 days shall constitute an affirmation of the National Committee's revocation of affiliate party status except when the last day of the 30 day period falls within 90 days prior to a regular convention, in which case the Judicial Committee's non-action shall result in reinstatement of affiliate party status.” (Bylaws Article 5.6)

“Failure of the Judicial Committee to rule within 30 days shall constitute an affirmation of the National Committee's suspension of the officer. At such time as the suspension is final, the office in question shall be deemed vacant.” (Bylaws Article 6.7)

“Failure of the Judicial Committee to rule within 30 days shall constitute an affirmation of the National Committee's suspension of the member-at-large. At such times as the suspension is final, the office in question shall be deemed vacant.” (Bylaws Article 7.5)

“If the decision is vetoed by the Judicial Committee, it shall be declared null and void.” (Bylaws Article 7.12)

“If the plank is vetoed by the Judicial Committee, it will be declared null and void but can be reinstated by a 3/4 vote of the convention.” (Rule 5.7)

“If the resolution is vetoed by the Judicial Committee, it will be declared null and void but can be reinstated by a 3/4 vote of the convention.” (Rule 6.2)

“The Judicial Committee shall meet and act on this appeal within 30 days and before the election.” (Bylaws Article 14.5)

Where the Committee does not act, the default judgment is built into each bylaw provision related to the Judicial Committee, with exception of Article 14.5.

8. FINAL THOUGHTS

8.1 Summary

The 2026 convention body was informed - before, during, and after the ballot - that without additional action, the two members elected would appoint the remaining five.

The 2026 convention body declined multiple times to order otherwise (*section 3*). The delegates were not deceived, surprised or hurried.

The “remaining members of the Judicial Committee” performed their bylaws-mandated duty to appoint vacancies through email ballot with a sub-quorum body, as had been explicitly expressed by previous convention bodies and codified in the bylaws.

The Judicial Committee is a bylaws-defined standing committee, responsible to the convention body, and exists regardless of the number of members serving. A Judicial Committee that cannot act would cause every matter otherwise brought before it to be found in bylaws-mandated default judgment.

A body cannot decide its own authority, and neither can those who bring the concerns of objections contemporaneously. The only body that can resolve any claims regarding the legitimacy of the Judicial Committee is a convention body.

On a personal note, since this is just my opinion anyway: I have opposed Approval Voting for these elections. I do not like multi-winner races, generally. I supported the motion at the 2020 National Convention to change the election of the Judicial Committee to be by LNC region; the delegates did not, by a vote of 71 to 278.

8.2 Final Interpretation is left to the reader, until convention

The reader is now faced with a decision of their own; which interpretation to adopt.

One interpretation takes into account the documented history of the party, both in word and in deed, with the bylaws interpreted to work in harmony to push forward with a functional organization.

The other interpretation seeks to interpret the bylaws in a way that ignores the written history of the party, ignores the tradition of the party, and ignores a reasonable plain-meaning interpretation of bylaws, causing a crucial part of the organization to cease to function for four years.

Choose what you want. You're a Libertarian. I'm not telling you what to do.

(But I grew up Catholic, so I'll probably judge you for it.)

9. DISCLOSURES RELATING TO THIS ACCOUNT

As the author of this document, I appear in several of the party's records set out above. Some other Judicial Committee members also appear. Each such fact is recorded here.

9.1 The 2014 Convention – a point of order upon the majority requirement

The 2014 minutes record a point of order, that candidates receiving less than a majority are not to be elected, as raised by myself, Ken Moellman. The reading of Convention Rule 8(2)(c) which this document adopts is therefore a reading I advanced publicly on the floor of a convention twelve years before this appeal, in a matter concerning the election of at-large members of the National Committee, having nothing to do with any modern controversy which exists or could have been foreseen.

I record that not by way of excuse but because it bears on what the fact is worth. A construction of a rule advanced when nothing turned on it is better evidence of what the rule means than one advanced when something does.

Nothing here depends upon that point of order. What the 2014 minutes establish is what the convention *did*: it suspended the rule in order to seat a candidate without a majority, which it would have had no occasion to do unless the rule forbade it. The conduct proves the reading; the point of order merely names it. (*section 4.*)

9.2 The 2018 Convention – teller

I served as a teller at the 2018 convention. It is disclosed for the same reason and carries no more weight. (*section 4.*)

9.3 The 2022 Convention – presiding, and the ruling recorded there

I presided at the 2022 Regular Convention over two of its three days, having succeeded to the chair as vice-chair when the presiding officer became unable to continue. The ruling this document recites from that convention is my own: the ruling that a point of order was well taken, that changing voting thresholds in the middle of a vote is improper.

How that attribution is established, rather than asserted. The minutes name the ruling only as “the Chair’s.” I called the third day to order; the minutes record my resuming the gavel

before the motion in question was made. I was the chair throughout the exchange. The attribution rests on the minutes and not upon anyone's recollection, the events being four years past.

I do not treat this as a reason to leave the episode aside. A ruling of the chair is an act of the assembly and not of the person who occupies the chair. It was subject to appeal by any delegate; no appeal was taken; and an unappealed ruling stands as the body's own disposition of the question. That is the same footing on which this document treats the rulings of the presiding officer in 2026 – including the several from which appeals *were* taken, and one from which an appeal was refused. A Committee which counted a chair's unappealed ruling as the assembly's act in 2026 and as an individual's act in 2022 would be applying two rules.

Nothing is rested upon it. The proposition affirms that a candidate without a majority is not elected, and that seating one requires suspension comes from the suspension of Convention Rule 8(2)(c) based upon the 2014 record of the rule's adoption and its suspension the same day, and from the 2016, 2018 and 2020 records. Strike 2022 from the account and nothing changes. It is included because it happened, and its inclusion completes the account of the record. (*section 4.*)

9.4 The 2026 Convention – election to the Committee, and the appointments

At the 2026 Regular Convention two members of the Committee were elected by the delegates – Avens O'Brien and myself. Those two members thereafter appointed the five remaining members under Article 8, Section 1. This document addresses the manner in which the Committee was constituted, as an account and not as a holding.

One of the appointed members, Pat Dixon, made a request for information on Monday, May 25, about how the form of the motion made by Ms. Purcell to suspend the rules would affect the nomination process.

One of the appointed members, Dr. Charles Moulton, was a member of the 2010 Bylaws and Rules Committee, which unanimously recommended the vacancy provision the convention adopted. He was also one of the three signatories of the 2016 email from the Judicial Committee informing the LNC of their appointments to vacancies.

9.5 A previous analysis published on this subject

On July 7, 2026, some weeks before this document was written, I published an analysis of the filling of Judicial Committee vacancies after a convention closes.

That analysis is superseded by this one and should not be relied upon. It was written before I had gone back through the Party's records, and it addressed the question in general terms

rather than from the convention history. Nothing here rests upon it, and it is not cited as authority for anything.

When the question was pressed, I returned to the Party's own records and found the 2010 and 2014 material. This document reasons from Article 8, Section 1, from Article 13, from the canon at RONR 56:68(3), from RONR 46:45, and from the convention minutes.

No entity is able to rule upon its own legitimacy, this is not a ruling, and this is not a work product of the Judicial Committee.

10. CITATIONS

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2024 Regular Convention minutes

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