Learning from the Past — Funding Liberty Chapter 3 Part 1

Chapter Three

Browne’s 1994-1995 Campaign Finances

Chapter One described the Willis Invoice, Willis’s surprising response, and evidence that Browne knew and approved of Willis’s conduct. The Invoice was itself unremarkable, being simply a billing for routine fundraising efforts. Only in context is the Willis Invoice staggering. The context appeared in Chapter Two, where I described machinations involving Perry Willis, Bill Winter, National Chair Steve Dasbach, the National Committee, and the Browne Campaign. The Libertarian National Committee had clear conflict of interest rules forbidding LNC staff to support a pre-nomination campaign. The limited available evidence indicates that, in violation of these rules, Willis and Winter were both part of the Browne campaign’s innermost circle.

While these behind-the-scenes machinations were happening, Harry Browne was running for President. He and his team raised money, appeared at state conventions, and tried to capture delegate support. Above the undercover politicking, Browne ran a perfectly orthodox Presidential nominating campaign, revealed by his filings with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and presented here.

[This Chapter is representative of the book I had originally planned to write, a book discussing where the money went. I intended to contrast Browne’s Campaign spending and strategy with the strategies of other Third Parties, notably the far more successful Nader 2000 campaign. When I began this book after th 2000 election, it appeared to me that the last two Libertarian Presidential campaigns had not been effective. The comparison with Nader, Philips, Hagelin, and other Third Party Presidential candidates was intended to reveal why Browne might have been ineffective, and what future Libertarian campaigns might do better. The Willis Invoice put an entirely different perspective on the campaign and on the Browne Campaign’s political methods.]

The material here is largely from Browne’s FEC filings. For each quarter or month, the filings tell how Browne’s campaign spent its money. The interesting discussions are in the text. For many readers the money you see being spent here was originally your money, so you may have a personal interest in what was done with it. I know that tables of numbers can be dull. However, some people will want accountant-level detail before they believe my conclusions.

What sort of money does a Libertarian Presidential campaign handle? Here’s what the Browne Campaign raised and spent in the two years leading up to the nomination:

Browne’s Pre-Nomination Finances

The Table supports Willis’s claim that in late 1995 the Browne campaign faced severe financial challenges. Up through September 1995, the Browne Campaign experienced growth, with income increasing quarter after quarter. It then encountered challenges. Donations to the Browne campaign fell in late 1995 and nearly collapsed at the start of 1996. Donations in January 1996 were down almost 50% relative to the previous July-September. Donations for the first quarter of 1996 were $134,468, far less than in any of the previous three quarters. February 1996 shows a respite, donations more than doubling relative to January. If the February increase were due to Willis’s December-January-February letters, Willis would indeed have made a significant contribution to Browne’s fundraising. Without February’s increase in income or reductions in spending, the campaign would by the end of March have been $35,000 in debt, an extremely large load for most Libertarian Presidential campaigns.

The actual numbers sharpen this qualitative picture. For the third quarter of 1995 campaign income was up to $171,000. In the last quarter, despite the approach of the presidential primaries income fell back to $149,000. Income then crashed. Quoting incomes as quarterly rates, January brought in only $97,000 per quarter, barely 50% of the rate of the previous Summer. While February saw a brief recovery to $204,000 at the quarterly rate, March saw income fall again, back (adjusted to a quarterly rate) of $102,000. Corresponding to the fall in income was a decrease in cash on hand, from $45,730 at the start of July 1995 down to $760 at the end of March, 1996. Cash on hand did recover by the end of June 1996, nearly up to $50,000, apparently because the campaign imposed rigid financial controls. According to the FEC reports, while the 1996 campaign’s income rose markedly as the National Convention approached, its spending stayed nearly constant.