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Apocalypse 2001: The LNC Ignores the Evidence

In writing this, Gorman of course understood that LNC, Inc. is a large, complicated organization, with 4 National Officers, 5 At-Large members, 9 Regional Representatives, 9 Alternates, paid staffers, interns, contractors,… It was exceedingly likely that some of them did not know what was going on. Blaming everyone without exception for not blowing the whistle is not appropriate, even though the de facto loan was a matter of public record in a report filed under penalty of perjury.

Nonetheless, Lark’s report made clear that the Browne campaign was allowed to pay in July for a January mailing, without paying interest. Given Willis’s observation that the Browne campaign in this period was in a state of financial exigency, the loan may have been a major assist to Browne’s campaign plans.

Gorman has told me that representations were made to him at an LNC meeting by members of the National Staff, claiming that the special rate was a discount for the extensive list purchases by the Browne campaign. However, when he asked what the requirements were for getting the discount, no one on the LNC or Staff at the meeting had an answer. Furthermore, the existence of this quantity list deduction is not mentioned in any LNC statement sent to other Presidential candidates, including Gorman. The LNC has had a ‘net name’ policy, under which candidates do not pay for names that they already have on their own donor lists; however, it is extremely unlikely that Browne knew exactly 1/2 of the names on the LNC list. It is then challenging to see how the discounted rate could have arisen from an orthodox LNC rental policy.

The reduced-rate rental was not a loan. It was a direct cash subsidy of $3333 from LNC, Inc. to Harry Browne’s 1996 campaign. No matter who approved the subsidy, the special rate violated National Committee Rules and policies as published to other candidates. The reduced rate was a gift in kind from the LNC to the Browne campaign. Neither the LNC nor the Browne Campaign ever reported this gift in kind in their FEC filings, so supporters of Ohmen, Schiff, and Tompkins never learned about it.

In 2000, Lark had been elected to the LNC as the supported candidate of Browne, Cloud, and company. He was widely viewed as a likeable college professor, a model southern gentleman, but not a man who was likely to make waves. His investigation of the Browne scandal was shallow. He sent inquiries to the involved parties, who failed to respond. He piled up enormous files – largely multiple repetitions of the text of his questions—by asking similar questions of other people who might have had answers. After I specifically called to the LNC’s attention the anomalies in Browne’s spending on mailing lists, Lark and staff were able to go through the record and determine when the campaign had made payments.

And there Lark stopped. He had gone through the appropriate motions of asking questions, but presented no significant analysis of the data he generated. His reported position was that he had made inquiries, but that the full LNC should investigate. His investigation was frustrated by the unwillingness of at least some parties on each side of the dispute to reveal what they knew. Lark at first said there was no evidence showing that the LNC’s loans and gifts to the Browne campaign constituted special treatment of Browne. When Gorman produced such evidence, there was no response.

It should have been entirely possible to examine the LNC’s files over several presidential election cycles, to determine what rates were quoted in correspondence to other Presidential campaigns.  This examination was not performed. Instead, Lark made a pro forma investigation but not a serious forensic study. Lark had been elected by the Browne-Cloud-Willis faction of the Party, which now refused to assist in his inquiries. When it became apparent that the faction had been involved in serious irregularities amounting to substantial diversion of LNC resources to aid the Browne campaign, Lark failed to conclude in the face of Gorman’s clear evidence that the Browne campaign had received special treatment.

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