On the brighter side, it had been anticipated that many new members would not renew their memberships after their first year. The wave that had swept party membership up from 27,000 to 33,000 might have receded, taking Party membership with it. Perhaps because the Browne 2000 Presidential campaign did bring some new members, during 2000 there was no significant change in Libertarian Party membership. Only during 2001 did the tide begin to go out.
Project Archimedes could have had another financial function, consistent with Federal Election Commission Regulations. The law in place in 1998 limited how much money an individual donor can give to a political party. The limit had two parts. An individual could give to the National Committee $20,000 per year of “hard” money, money that can be used to assist candidates for Federal office. An individual could give far more “soft” money, money that can be used for party-building but cannot be used to support Federal candidates. Because the Libertarian Party had a legitimate membership structure, money spent on Project Archimedes was unambiguously ‘soft money’.
Suppose one had an extremely wealthy contributor, a Libertarian billionaire who gave the Party vast sums. This soft money could be used to run a membership recruitment campaign. The first $20,000 per year that each new recruit gives to the Party was at the time lawfully hard money, money that can be spent to support Federal candidates. Project Archimedes therefore functioned to convert large soft-money donations into smaller hard-money donations. If Project Archimedes failed to break even financially, the conversion would not be 100% efficient, but via this path the donations of a few Libertarian billionaires could be converted into extensive aid for the Party’s candidates.
This process suffered from one modest obstacle. There is absolutely no evidence that there are any Libertarian billionaires who give to the Party. In 2000, the three largest donations to the Party were for $50,000, $20,000, and $15,000. The conversion mechanism might exist in principle, but in reality there were almost no large soft money contributions waiting to be converted via Project Archimedes into hard money.
Project Archimedes failed. This failure was a serious challenge for National Chair David Bergland. Bergland had campaigned for Project Archimedes, worked through his campaign staff to extend his term through 2002, and run on the slogan ‘Performance, not Promises’. If he ran again in 2000, running for re-election to obtain the four years in office his 1998 supporters had tried to get for him by changing the By-Laws, his opponents would hurl at him the critique ‘Promises, not Performance’. Bergland chose not to run.
Where did the failure of Project Archimedes leave the Browne campaign? In 1997, Browne had announced two major targets, two goals that had to be reached before he ran for office. He wanted a much larger National party, one with 200,000 members. He wanted a million-dollar campaign warchest by the start of 2000.
Browne completely missed the first target. Party membership climbed by 6,000, not 60,000 or 160,000.
What about the second target? What about the million dollars of cash in the bank that the Browne campaign needed for its January 2000 launch? We turn now to Browne’s financial situation. We begin with Browne’s claims that he was in the process of raising one million dollars as a warchest with which to launch his campaign.
