The new Libertarian Party Judicial Committee Rules have led to further controversy on the LNC.
Austin Martin wrote against the rules, saying:
Chair, LNC, and members of the Judicial Committee:
A Judicial Committee exists to give Party members due process: a fair hearing, on the record, before a body that decides on the merits. The Rules of Appellate Procedure proposed for the 2026–2030 term do the opposite. They are built to let the Committee avoid deciding, avoid explaining, and avoid being seen. I concur fully with Alfa Shaw’s critique, and I will break down the worst of it.
Section 2.8 lets five members reject, strike, or refuse to publish any filing “without reaching the merits,” and throw out an entire petition as “sufficiently egregious.” The grounds are words the Rules never define: “clearly false,” “frivolous,” “language not suitable,” “decorum,” “not permitted in a judicial proceeding.” A body that can dismiss a case for being “clearly false” without ruling on whether it is true is not adjudicating. It is gatekeeping, on standards it writes for itself and applies to whomever it chooses. There is no defense whatsoever for this abject abuse of process and breach of our bylaws.
This is not a theoretical defect. Article 9, Section 2 charges the Committee with real duties: affiliate-revocation appeals, officer suspensions, member-at-large suspensions, where the Bylaws say the Committee shall hold a hearing and interested persons shall have the right to appear and submit evidence. Section 2.8 hands the Committee a tool to refuse the very hearings the Bylaws command. A procedural rule cannot override a Bylaws duty. To the extent 2.8 purports to, it is invalid.
The rest of the design points the same Kafkaesque direction. Members who never attend the hearing may still vote, up to ten days after it ends (Section 8.7), which means decision by people who never heard the case. Deliberations stay secret unless two-thirds vote to open them (Section 8.4). Nothing requires a written, reasoned opinion, so a bare ruling with no explanation will do. Redactions, publication, and even the case-management system itself sit under the Committee’s unchecked control (Sections 2.8, 5.1, 2.9). Each choice trades transparency for discretion and accountability for control.
These Rules are not a neutral housekeeping update. They equip a Committee to dismiss inconvenient petitions early, close its proceedings, bury its reasoning, and answer to no one. That is an offense to due process and to what this Party claims to stand for.
The LNC is not powerless here. Under Article 9, Section 3, these Rules take effect only if the LNC does not deny them by a two-thirds vote within sixty days of submission. I ask the LNC to consider what the JC presented and then exercise that power: deny these Rules and return them to the Judicial Committee for revision that restores merits-based decision, mandatory hearings, reasoned written opinions, and a real presumption of openness. [Editor: The National Chair has explained that the LNC does not have this authority. The LNC can say yeah or nay to the rules, nay leading to the old rules being in place.]
The Defects, Ranked by Damage to Due Process
Section 2.8, merits-blind rejection power. Five members can reject, strike, or refuse to publish any filing “without reaching the merits,” and dismiss an entire non-convention petition as “sufficiently egregious.” The grounds are undefined: “clearly false,” “frivolous,” “language not suitable,” decorum “not permitted in a judicial proceeding.” Worst because it lets the Committee refuse to decide cases the Bylaws (Article 9, Section 2) say it shall hear, on standards it writes for itself. This is the one with an actual ultra vires collision.
No mandatory written reasoned opinions. Section 9.3 requires that decisions be published, and Section 9.2 allows preliminary notification to be oral, but nothing requires the Committee to explain its reasoning or record its votes. A bare ruling suffices. This is what makes every other abuse unreviewable: you cannot challenge reasoning that is never stated.
Section 8.7, absent members vote up to ten days post-hearing. Members who never attended can still cast deciding votes within ten days. Decisions made by people who never heard the arguments, with a window open to post-hearing lobbying and no real-time scrutiny.
Section 8.4, deliberations secret by default. Deliberations occur in executive session unless a two-thirds vote opens them. The reasoning process, where the actual decision happens, is presumptively hidden, inverting the openness the Rules claim elsewhere.
Sections 2.6 and 2.7, executive session on subjective balancing. The JC may close proceedings at a petitioner’s request (privacy) or the LNC’s request (legal liability), weighing risk against openness with no defined criteria and no appeal. The LNC-liability carve-out is especially exploitable: the body being challenged can request closure.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5, burden of proof on submitters. Petitioners bear the full burden of proving signer eligibility and organizational authorization; the JC can reject signatures or entire filings if proof is deemed insufficient. A high, JC-judged bar that disadvantages grassroots and less-resourced petitioners. Compounds Section 2.8(j), which makes any such defect a rejection ground.
Section 7.1, amicus restricted to Sustaining members. Non-Sustaining members are cut out of amicus participation. Note: the claim that prior rules allowed broader filing is asserted in the comparison document but could not be verified against the 2022 text; treat the “rollback” framing as unconfirmed.
Section 3.3, JC defines who counts as a respondent. The Committee itself identifies any other member, affiliate, or committee “likely to be affected” as a prospective respondent, expanding or limiting the parties by its own judgment.
Section 2.9, optional, JC-controlled online system. The documentation system is discretionary and Committee-controlled, centralizing control over what is visible and when.
Section 8.6, oral argument fully discretionary. The JC may in its discretion offer oral argument “under such rules as the Committee shall specify,” controlling timing, format, and whether it happens at all.
Sections 2.3 and 6.1, timing asymmetries. Submissions must arrive before the hearing “except by leave of the Committee” (2.3); respondents get seven days or “promptly” at convention (6.1). Discretionary leave plus tight windows let the JC control whose late evidence comes in.
Self-policing, no external oversight of JC procedure. Nothing in the Rules provides a mechanism to challenge the JC’s own redactions, rejections, or procedural rulings beyond the JC itself. The only real external check is structural and sits outside the Rules: the LNC’s Article 9, Section 3 power to deny the Rules wholesale within sixty days of submission.
Two Cross-Cutting Notes
The catch-all in Section 2.8(j), rejection for any rules, format, or signature non-compliance, is what weaponizes the otherwise-minor procedural requirements above. It turns every formatting requirement into a dismissal “gotcha” to deny justice to anyone arbitrarily. This JC process, and presumably the members in it, seem more hostile to core LP principles like Due Process than the US government. The ranking above reflects due-process damage. If ranking instead by legal vulnerability, items 1 and 2 are where the ultra vires and Bylaws-duty arguments are strongest.
In short, these issues will lead to our decisions being vulnerable to court interventions and reversals. Instead of protecting internal governance decisions, this JC will open the LNC to serious legal risks which could also attach to individual officers for ultra vires acts or fiduciary breaches.
Mimi Robson wrote: After reading through the proposed rules, I agree that fifteen minutes isn’t enough time to work through a document that will govern the Judicial Committee for the next four years.Unless a working group is able to get together beforehand and come back with a substantially revised proposal, I’m not sure the July 5 meeting is the right time for the LNC to consider these rules. I’d much rather spend a little extra time getting them right than rush through a discussion that is unlikely to resolve the concerns that have been raised. Since the current rules remain in effect unless the LNC approves a new set of rules, I don’t think we need to force a decision before we’re ready to make one.
Travis Bost suggested: With official submission on June 7th, the LNC would have until August 6th to reject. An ad hoc committee set up for July could bring a yay or nay recommendation to the August 2nd monthly meeting.
Alfa Shaw turned the discussion into a motion:
Seeing as there are several members who appear favorable to an Ad Hoc committee being formed to examine this topic, I would like to notice a “Motion to create an Ad Hoc committee to examine the new JC Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the two analyses that have been prepared on them and to report back to the LNC with a recommendation, to be presented no later than the August 2nd, 2026 scheduled LNC meeting. Appointments to this committee to include: The two members who presented the analyses, other LNC members who wish to nominate themselves to serve on the committee, up to a maximum of 7 members.”
National Chair Evan McMahon wrote: Mr. Shaw, This would be out of order as Bylaws stipulate that the LNC can only vote to reject the JC’s proposed policies and procedures by a 2/3rd vote. If that occurs, then the procedures from the previous term are adopted. There is no mechanism for them to workshop, change, or amend the rules once presented to the LNC. We either vote them up or down and if voted down by 2/3… the prior rules stay in place. Also, the JC has requested that we not communicate with them as they are a separate body that wants to maintain independence from the LNC and such discussions. That has been the long-standing practice.
Austin Martin nominated Alex Flores for the JC Rules Proposal Review Committeee. Barbara Engelhardt and Sonja Feintech nominated themselves.
Be First to Comment