We finish Chapter One. It Gets Worse.
There are reasons to suppose that in late 1995 the Browne campaign was in a state of fiscal exigency, for good reason. Some readers will recall that Browne’s 1995 campaign strategy was pointed at the New Hampshire primary. As 1996 approached, Browne suddenly cancelled his New Hampshire plans. Browne kept the money he had raised for his New Hampshire campaign, but announced that he would not campaign in New Hampshire. All across America, checkbooks of offended donors slammed shut. Willis himself says Browne’s further fundraising letters “… weren’t pulling very well…”
Is Willis’s judgement on Presidential campaigns sound? Would Browne’s campaign really have collapsed? We will later consider the financial data released by Browne’s 1996 campaign, and what the data reveal. The internal evidence supports Willis’s claims. In late 1995 Browne’s campaign was in serious financial straits. Willis’s judgement is based on sound practical experience. He managed Browne’s 2000 Presidential campaign, from 1997 through supposed fiscal crises in 2000 and on to November. His 2001 letter on his 1995-1996 activities is informed by his experience running Browne’s second campaign. Furthermore, as of this writing no one from Browne’s 1996 campaign has been heard to contradict Willis’s claims about the importance of his letters.
Finally, it was certainly not in Willis’s best interests, or the best interests of the people he served, to make his claims if they were false. It would have been much better for the reputations of Willis, Browne, and Browne’s 1996 Campaign team if Willis had said that his letters didn’t matter, and that the letters had had no real effect on the nomination. If Willis had said the letters didn’t matter, he, Browne, and company could have agreed that although Willis should not have taken the money or done the work, the payment was de minimis: The money didn’t change much of anything.
There is a simple argument indicating that Willis is telling the truth. The argument is not totally reliable, because different people have different estimates as to where their best interests lie: Nonetheless, when someone in Willis’s position makes a confession that seriously harms his position and reputation, it is very plausible that the confession is true. If it were not true it would never have been made, except perhaps to cover up an even worse truth. Willis’s record for honesty is not untarnished, but if he were going to tell a lie, one would have expected that he would not tell a lie that made him look worse than he really was, unless there was an even worse truth that needed disguise. The internal evidence thus strongly indicates that Willis’s specific claims about his deeds and their consequences are true.
Browne Knew and Approved of His Campaign’s Actions
What did the candidate know about the deeds of his campaign? Harry Browne would not have been the first candidate to discover that his campaign staff had done something unfortunate. In an email dated May 13, 2001, Harry Browne addressed Perry Willis, the Libertarian Party’s Executive Committee (Chair Jim Lark, Vice Chair Dan Fylstra, Treasurer Deryl Martin, and National Committee members Dehn, Bisson, and Gilson, but curiously omitting National Secretary Steve Givot), most other members of the Party National Committee, and five senior members of the Party’s Washington Staff: Steve Dasbach, Bill Winter, Ron Crickenberger, George Getz, and Nick Dunbar. Browne wrote:
“A lot of people are quite distressed over Perry’s message. I understand that. I don’t expect the distress to be abated in the near future. However, I would like to make one suggestion, if I may.
“It would be well for people to wait before speaking in order to give as much thought to their reactions as Perry gave to his statement before he released it. Shooting from the hip merely puts you in a position of later having to stand by statements and positions that you may come to realize you may not have thought through. Perry spent several days on his statement. I went over it with him. I think it might be prudent for you, too, to think over the consequences of your statements before releasing them.
“I will issue a statement in a few days, after emotions have relaxed a little. Just as I’ve suggested for you, _I_ want to be sure that I don’t say anything too quickly that I might regret.
“With best wishes,
“Harry”
Browne’s remarks are interesting for several reasons. Browne, speaking of Willis and Willis’s statement, writes “I went over it with him.” This is the point at which an honest man, surprised to learn that his staff had done something that he wishes they hadn’t, might reasonably have added a few words in sadness. They could be phrased positively, e.g. ‘I knew it was important to help my friend Perry with his statement, even though I was disappointed by some of the things I learned that he had done, all with the best of intentions.’ Browne said nothing of the kind.
Browne also said “wait before speaking in order to give as much thought to [your] reactions as Perry gave to his statement before he released it.” Browne went over Willis’s statement with Willis before it was released, so he knew whereof he spoke. Browne testifies that Willis’s remarks cannot be construed as an emotional outburst, but are a calculated response to the situation.
Did Browne know in 1996, or did his email adhere to the letter of his suggestion ‘don’t say anything too quickly that I might regret’ by carefully saying nothing? Browne promised to release a statement of his own. As of this writing, he has yet to do so.
What did Browne know in 1996? All doubt was soon to be removed.
On Wednesday, May 23, the Executive Committee of the Libertarian National Committee (James Lark, Dan Fylstra, Steve Givot, Deryl Martin, Joe Dehn, and Ken Bisson, with Michael Gilson de Lemos absent for medical reasons) had an extended telephone meeting to discuss the situation.
The events of that meeting are not secret. Michael Gilson de Lemos (MG to his friends), LNC Regional Representative from the Southeast US, posted to his Regional Email list the draft minutes of the May 23 LNC Executive Committee Meeting. Attached to those minutes was a pair of letters identified as an email exchange between Harry Browne and long-time LP activist Mary Gingell. The emails were supplied to the Executive Committee by Gingell’s husband, LNC member Joe Dehn.
I quote from the emails (edited to delete email addresses and one personal reference):
—————
From: “Mary Gingell”
To: “Harry Browne”
Saturday, May 12, 2001 1:25 AM
Hi, Harry.
It occurs to me that now that Perry’s memo is being broadcast around the country, the following question is sure to come up – is the fact that this memo can be found on the harrybrowne.org website an indication that you concur with Perry’s opinion that violating the LPC conflict of interest rules in 1996 in order to help the Browne for President campaign is justifiable? And even if you don’t believe that allowing him to post this memo on your website is an implicit endorsement of it, what, in fact, is your position on the issue?
So I guess I am asking it . . . as someone who defended him, and Winter, and Sharon, and you during that time and assured people that they were not, in fact, in violation of the policy. I would appreciate knowing how you felt about it then, and how you feel about it now.
————-
From: “Harry Browne”
To: “Mary Gingell”
Date: Tue, 15 May 2001 00:29:47 -0500
Dear Mary:
Sorry for the delay in getting back to you.
I’ll be issuing a statement in the next couple of days. I imagine it will find its way to you.
In the meantime, you should know that I was aware of Perry’s actions and agreed to them.
Harry
——————-
These two messages substantially remove doubt that Browne had approved his campaign’s covert transactions with Perry Willis.
Substantial additional evidence was recently supplied by John Famularo. Famularo provides an extensive list of email exchanges between Willis and the Browne campaign team. Given that their genuineness has not been questioned to date, the exchanges show that Willis continually participated in managing Browne’s 1996 campaign throughout all of 1995 and 1996, and that Browne’s campaign team knew he was doing so. A series of late February, 1996 documents confirm that Browne was personally aware: Willis was preparing the co-called ‘Ladbroke’ fundraising letter. In an exchange with Willis, a person who, from his statements, clearly appears to be Browne edited and commented on the writing.
Further revelations came from Stuart Reges, Senior Lecturer at the University of Arizona and the Browne Campaign’s accountant. In a message dated Sunday, May 20, Reges sent the email list lpus-misc@dehnbase.org a long statement with the topic “Famularo”, including the pointed observation:
“John Famularo tried to warn me on several occasions that there were things going on that I didn’t know about. I wouldn’t say that I disbelieved John, but in the absence of anything specific, it was difficult to take him too seriously. Now that John has produced the invoice from Perry Willis, I have to admit that he was right that I was working with people who were keeping things from me.
“I did the accounting for the two Browne campaigns, so I know a lot about where the money went. I did not know until a week ago that Perry had continued to work for the campaign even after the LNC forbade him from doing so. They paid him through Jack Dean’s consulting firm so that I wouldn’t know about it and wouldn’t include it on the FEC reports. I also didn’t know that he’d lied about it all these years. I’m very disappointed in Perry and I told him so.”
There is some evidence that Reges’s words must be taken strictly literally. Famularo recalled to the author a conversation he says he had with Reges in 1996. In the course of a longer discussion, Famularo asserts that Reges indicated that “at a Browne campaign meeting (we) were discussing whether Perry would be able to ‘put this one past the LNC executive committee’. Reges and some of the others were skeptical but Perry assured them that he “had them in the palm of the hand”. From the conversation, Willis was involved in Browne campaign meetings, and Reges knew that he was involved, but from Reges’s statements Reges did not know that Willis was working for pay.
One Short Invoice
The 1996 Invoice and Willis’s confession tear the veil from a complex series of under-the-table financial and consulting arrangements. In 1996, it appeared that Harry Browne had won the Libertarian Party’s Presidential nomination by open, fair, vigorous campaigning. The truth is apparently different. Browne’s 2000 campaign manager, Perry Willis, now admits that Browne won the 1996 nomination because Browne made at least one illicit payment of laundered money to the Libertarian Party’s National Director, one Perry Willis. Corresponding to the payments, Willis violated Party rules to rescue Browne’s campaign from imminent catastrophe. Without Willis’s actions, Browne would have been defeated in 1996.
Browne’s 1996 campaign had opponents—Rick Tompkins, Irwin Schiff, and Doug Ohmen. These other campaigns professed, perhaps for the good of the Party, that this was an honest race. Many of their supporters believed them. In fact, Browne’s opponents were in a crooked contest, in which they played by one set of rules while Harry Browne and his campaign played by another.
Supporters of Tompkins, Schiff, and Ohmen thought they were paying dues to support a neutral National staff that treated their candidates the same way it treated candidate Harry Browne. They were instead paying dues to support a National Director who was hard at work campaigning against Tompkins, Schiff, and Ohmen and campaigning for Browne. Through clever arrangements, the Browne campaign had the use of Perry Willis’s professional services for mere thousands of dollars, while the National Committee paid Willis a living wage. Furthermore, it has recently been learned from an unexamined part of the public record that—prior to the convention—the LNC gave Browne direct financial support worth more than $10,000.
Did Willis’s efforts truly give Browne the nomination? That’s a bit less clear. You can’t beat someone with no one. To some ears, Tompkins was perhaps a bit sharp. Schiff’s income tax agenda, while reflecting a Libertarian desire for lower taxes, really had a very different intellectual basis than the Party Platform. Ohmen had campaigned in California, Colorado, and Pennsylvania. Browne’s opponents raised much less money than Browne did. One of the reasons that Browne’s opponents did not raise more money was that Browne’s fundraising machine had already used Willis’s letters to vacuum it up. Another reason that Browne raised more money is that in the first half of 1996 Browne had the use of the LNC mailing list without having to pay for it until he won the nomination.
If Browne’s campaign had collapsed, the strong points of the Tompkins, Schiff, and Ohmen campaigns would have been more visible. Even if Browne’s active contenders appear too weak to have won, nature abhors a political vacuum. Other contenders might have emerged.
Indeed, someone else was campaigning. Someone who was a good speaker. Someone who had visited large numbers of state conventions. Someone who had already won the strong support of many Libertarians. Someone whose campaign slogan was remembered by the Libertarian masses.
The slogan?
“Just say Jo”
If Browne had withdrawn, 1996 Vice Presidential aspirant Jo Jorgenson would have automatically been a credible Presidential possibility.
Finally…
The dominoes do not stop falling in 1996. In 1998 Browne used his reputation from the 1996 nomination to install a supportive National Chair and National Committee staff. Browne’s 1998 activities helped Browne and his new campaign committee capture the 2000 Presidential Nomination, and helped his supporters to retain control of the National Committee.
