Continuing from my book Funding Liberty:
A New Anomaly
Recall that in the first half of 1996, there had been an oddity in the Browne campaign’s mailing expenses. For February-July, there were almost no payments for list rental. Browne had done pre-convention mailings, but his FEC reports gave no hint of payments for list rentals. As we now know, Browne’s campaign had been allowed to use the LNC’s mailing list, without paying for it until well after it had been used.
A similar oddity appears three years later. In 1999 the Browne campaign spent more than $81,000 on printing and mailing, but only $7300 on renting lists to which to do direct mail. Based on precedent, corresponding to the $81,000 in printing on would expect to find $15,000 or more in list rental. Furthermore, essentially all of the list rentals were paid in the second quarter of 1999. The Browne campaign made very large mailings in the third and fourth quarters of 1999, but paid nothing in list rental. Of course, part of their large January 2000 list rental payment could correspond to their December 1999 mailings. But what of the rest of the year? Did the Browne campaign mail only to its historic donors?
There are rumors that in 1996 the Browne campaign cut a deal, giving it permanent use of the National Committee’s full 1996 mailing list in exchange for giving the party a list of all contacts generated by the Browne Campaign. Browne did give the National Party a list of his contacts, discussed above as the P Transaction, but there is no mention in National Committee minutes that Browne would get the National Party Membership list in exchange.
After all, Browne had already been given Party membership extensions and subscriptions for all his donors. I have been unable to confirm what truth lies behind this rumored exchange, which would have given the Browne 2000 Campaign an enormous financial advantage over any competitors.
In 1999, the Libertarian National Committee made several large membership recruitment drives. One might have expected that the Browne campaign would have wanted to rent the expanded LNC list as soon as possible to prospect for additional donors among the new members. After all, supposedly the whole point of Project Archimedes was to develop additional Party members who would donate to Browne’s campaign. Now the Party had developed extensive lists of new names. There is no indication in Browne’s FEC reports that the Browne campaign pursued the names, for example by renting the expanded LNC mailing list .
1997-1999, A Summary: Browne’s 5% Financial Solution
In 1997, Harry Browne had set his campaign’s financial goal for 2000. By the start of 2000, it was to have accumulated one million dollars cash in hand for a spectacular campaign launch.
The campaign had accumulated less than 5% of its financial target. Now Browne needed a new campaign solution, a 5% solution that worked with 5% of the cash on hand.
Over the first three years of the Browne 2000 campaign, $914,487 had come in through the door, and $869,816 had gone the other way. After nearly three years of work, the Browne campaign had indeed raised almost a million dollars. But it didn’t have a million dollars in hand. Instead of spending very little money and saving the remainder, the way Browne had said was necessary, the campaign had saved very little and spent the rest. At the end of 1999 the campaign had only $44,670 in the bank.
From 1997 to 1998, the Browne Campaign more than tripled its income. From 1998 to 1999, the campaign again more than doubled its income. Unfortunately, over the same period 1997-1999 campaign spending increased almost ninefold. Instead of accumulating a million dollars, the campaign went through a near-million dollars almost as fast as it was raised.
Browne had identified two mandatory objectives for running a good campaign in 2000: A million dollars cash on hand; 200,000 members by 2000. The Browne Campaign totally failed to reach either objective. Cash on hand was less than 5% of the campaign’s original objective. The increase in membership was only 6% of its original objective. At the end of 1999, the Browne campaign had neither significant money in the bank nor a Libertarian Party of even 50,000 members. It had totally failed to meet the primary goals Browne had set.
The Browne campaign had also ignored the unspoken problems created by its 1996 Presidential and 1998 National Chair campaigns. In 1996, Browne ran for the nomination against Rick Tompkins, Irwin Schiff, and several others. Having defeated them at the 1996 National convention, Browne did not make an effort post-convention to reach out to their partisans or support them in their other political activities.
In 1996, Browne made political enemies. In 1995, he had promised the Libertarians of New Hampshire that he would vigorously contest the 1996 Presidential Primary. Many New Hampshire Libertarians made large contributions to his campaign to help carry out this promise. As Fall 1995 approached, Browne changed course 180 degrees, and suddenly announced that he would not contest the New Hampshire primary. The New Hampshire contest could have been a quarter of Browne’s campaign year. It would instead not be significant part of the campaign.
In 1996 Browne had available a swarm of sycophants and lickspittles, who promptly, vigorously repeated Browne’s assertion that changing strategy showed the maturity of Browne’s thinking. The sycophants and lickspittles had forgotten a fundamental principle of politics. Politicians often break promises to constituents. Those promises don’t count. For a politician to break a promise to a fellow politician is a mortal sin. Between politicians, promises are the sole stock in trade. The New Hampshire Libertarians with whom Browne broke faith were not his constituents. They were Party activists, Browne’s fellow politicians.
Browne had an opportunity to redeem himself with some New Hampshire Libertarians. Come 1998, Browne could have gone to New Hampshire and campaigned for New Hampshire candidates for other offices, helping New Hampshire to recover the major party status that it had lost in 1996. Browne chose not to do so.
Critics have suggested that Browne’s actions reflected his desire to avoid having a New Hampshire primary in 2000. Whether that was his desire or not, the goal was attained. In 1998, New Hampshire did not regain major party status, so in 2000 New Hampshire Libertarians did not have a Presidential Primary. Many New Hampshire Libertarians neither forgave nor forgot. At their State Convention, some spoke well of Browne’s plans, but when it came time to do work most New Hampshire activists sat on their hands.
Browne paid in 2000 for his decisions. Many prominent New Hampshire Libertarians closed their checkbooks to Browne. The Browne volunteer effort in New Hampshire was chaired by Richard Watras, Jr. of Massachusetts, because—as Watras has stated to me—Browne could find no New Hampshire activist to lead his effort.
