Hornberger also sent a letter to the FEC. The letter included the key phrase that the letter was not a complaint. As released to the public, it was also not notarized. The FEC has extremely specific rules about what it may act on as a complaint (You can find them for yourself at www.fec.gov.). Under FEC regulations, Hornberger’s letter was not a complaint. The FEC had already had press inquiries about Browne, so Hornberger’s letter did nothing to exacerbate the Campaign’s legal circumstances with respect to the FEC.
Browne supporters claimed on Libertarian email lists that Hornberger had turned Browne in to the FEC. To the author’s eyes, these claims were in fact efforts to discredit Hornberger by falsely accusing him of trying to damage the Libertarian Party. Nonetheless, Hornberger handed the Browne campaign a most excellent way of distracting Libertarians from negative features of the Browne campaign. The Campaign’s supporters could invest their time and bandwidth denouncing Hornberger. Hornberger was said to be the man who turned the Browne campaign over to the FEC, a claim that for several reasons was transparently false:
- The FEC already knew about the issue. Their press spokesman Kelly Huff had taken questions from a major news outlet. A major national newspaper had used the Browne announcement in their lead editorial. This early publicity was hailed by Perry Willis in the March 22, 2000 LibertyWire as a ‘very good sign’, a demonstration of how much more publicity the Browne campaign would get when it actually filed the FEC challenge.
- The FEC has a legally prescribed format for filing criminal complaints, without which the complaint is ignored. Hornberger’s letter did not comply with the format and could not be used as a complaint by the FEC.
- The FEC never did anything. It never responded to Hornberger ’s letter.
- Well after Hornberger’s letter went out, the Browne campaign was actively publicizing its plans to challenge the Federal Election Commission. On March 23, Browne’s Campaign Journal #5 shows that Browne had an interview on Good Day USA, carried by 250 radio stations. The challenge was Browne’s lead topic. If the Browne Campaign was at all concerned that the FEC might find out from Hornberger about the civil disobedience campaign, why were they taking steps that would be at least as likely to call themselves to the FEC’s attention?
and, most important,
(v) If the Browne campaign had ever had any intent of litigating, it was an absolute prerequisite that the FEC undertake an enforcement action against them. If the FEC simply ignored Browne, the Browne Campaign could not readily ask the courts to block the FEC enforcement action as unconstitutional, because there would be no FEC action to block. Without FEC action, most litigation from the Browne campaign would be moot. [Of course, the Campaign could have asked the courts for a peremptory judgement, but to do that they did not need to break the law at all.] Only if the Browne campaign had no intent of undertaking legal action against the election laws would it make sense for the Campaign to announce that they were not filing and then complain that they might receive FEC scrutiny
All things considered, Browne’s announced failure to comply with FEC regulations worked wonders for his campaign. To some Libertarians, Browne was a hero for defying Federal Law. To other Libertarians, Browne had shown that he was sufficiently competent as a campaigner that he could earn press.
Browne’s most important strength was the three years he had spent running. Noncompliance protected the value of his claims about his efforts. So long as his finances remained secret, the Potemkin village of Browne’s campaign would show only its front facade. No one would know his Campaign was almost broke. The longer the secret could be preserved, the better off Browne would be. The Campaign’s actual situation might eventually be revealed, but it would take weeks or months for most Libertarians to hear the truth. Even if the truth came out before the convention, Browne’s opponents might well not have enough time to exploit it. By convention time, many delegates would already have committed to Browne, often firmly enough that rumors of a scandal would not lead them to change their votes.
To close out March, how did the Browne campaign spent its money? Spending on associates fell by almost $9000, with ten associates receiving:
Jim Babka $4,167
Barbara Braun $856
Robert Brunner $2,574
Erich Covey $384
Robert DeVoil $3,401
Debra Greeson $1,428
Jennifer Willis $2,000
Steve Willis $2,911
Perry Willis $5,167
Stephanie Yanik $500
TOTAL: $23,388
while firms long associated with the campaign received:
Optopia $3,152
TOTAL: $3,152
Among the associates, particularly dramatic was the reduction by $4000 in payments to Stephanie Yanik for administrative services. The only increases were new Associate Barbara Braun, and an additional $1000 for campaign management to Perry Willis. On a percentage base, spending on associates and their firms fell only slightly, to 31.6%.
The campaign also had major external expenses, including
Polaris Productions $15,000
The Firm MultiMedia $15,000
William J Olson $5,000
Newman Communications $4,666
CopyRight (videotapes) $4,000
Seabreeze Travel $3,000
AccuMail, Inc $2,828
Walter Karl (list rental) $2,103
TOTAL: $51,597
and $1683 to the candidate himself for travel and other expenses. The $5000 for William J Olson is to a PC Trust Account, a mechanism for locking money away from the campaign for the announced FEC lawsuit.
