Coordination between campaigns was rather limited. As it turned out, none of the Libertarians who had volunteered to run for state legislature were in my Congressional District, so I was unable to share petitioners. The statewide slate did no advertising on Worcester-area (my Congressional district) media outlets, under the pretext that they advertised on Boston outlets that could be heard in Worcester.
The LPMA Becomes a “Major” Party
Two statewide candidates did receive more than 3% of the popular vote. Under state law, they were allowed to designate a group to manage the Libertarian Party’s affairs until state law governing the election of state committeemen and state committeewomen became operative. In early 1999 they turned to the Libertarian Party of Massachusetts Political Action Committee, on which I was one of four board members. [As a candidate, I could not be a principal officer of the PAC, but I could be on the board.]
The Libertarian Party of Massachusetts PAC was not a political party. It was a PAC, no different than that run by the physicians or by the Boston transit workers’ union, created in 1997 when the LPMA lost Major Party status. After a somewhat extended negotiating session, LPMAPAC Board members agreed in early 1999 that we would appoint new board members from LAMA, they would take control of the LPMAPAC, and that two of us would leave the Board. I had some doubts about letting the eastern group take control of the LPMAPAC, when they already controlled LAMA. How many Libertarian organizations could one group of people need? We spent a lot of time voting 2-2, so my agreement was in practice necessary. I finally agreed. It seemed at the time to be the right thing to do. In retrospect, by agreeing I did enormous damage to the Libertarian movement in Massachusetts.
In 1999, Massachusetts Libertarians were presented with a serious, credible opportunity to elect a city council member in Worcester, which was then the second largest city in New England. Libertarian activist Jerry Horton, who had a long record of various sorts of community involvement, challenged do-nothing city counsel member Steve Patten. Horton assembled 100 volunteers, raised close to ten thousand dollars, and executed all the maneuvers of a serious campaign. He lost by approximately 500 votes, getting 46% of the vote in a two way race. Early on, he approached the eastern Massachusetts Libertarian establishment, looking for assistance. As the matter was described to me, Horton was not successful in establishing contact with eastern Massachusetts activists. While he was a dues-paying national Party member and a registered Libertarian, Horton never received a penny or meaningful support from the state organization. He concluded that his Libertarian registration carried only negatives.
Before election day 1999 he re-registered as an ‘Unenrolled’ (independent) voter. While Horton is still a National Party member, he has continued to distance himself from the State Party. In 2000 he voted in the Republican Presidential primary, which under Massachusetts Law enrolled him as a Republican.
Every election cycle, a substantial number of State Legislators take permanent state jobs, each legislator being replaced in a special election. In 1999, PVLA member Paul Norton ran for State Representative in a special election. Norton was one of very few Libertarians to contest a special state legislative election. He requested support from the State Party. It did not help Norton’s request for funds that the state group was not trying to take advantage of special elections for open seats. The PVLA had long since quit trying to seat its representative on the LAMA State Board, so Norton had no direct voice to speak for him.
The State organizations, LPMA and LAMA, offered Norton no concrete support for his campaign other than lists of registered voters, lists that he already had from town clerks. LAMA/LPMA did ask for a campaign business plan, which Norton’s campaigners spent much time writing. No money appeared. Five days before the special election, Norton’s Campaign Manager suddenly received a phone call: Up to ten thousand dollars was available if he had a way to spend it. Norton’s campaign had no full time staff, nor plans to accommodate such an unexpected last-second windfall. The money was declined because it was too late to spend it effectively.
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